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BOOK REVIEW
ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING

by Frank M. Coffin
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994; pp. 373, $27.50)
Reviewed by Richard L. O'Meara*
If one were to ask the members of the Maine legal community to
define the term "judicial temperament," many would answer the
question simply by referring to Frank Coffin.1 Judge Coffin's newest book, On AppeaL" Courts, Lawyering, and Judging, illustrates
why the Judge has earned such overwhelming respect.' This highly
personal work permits readers a glimpse "behind the scenes" at the
judicial life of a man who has forged a highly successful career of
public service marked by sensitive, fair, and well-reasoned decisionmaking and by good-humored, collegial relationships with all of his
colleagues in the legal community and beyond.
It is no coincidence that On Appeal is the work product of a man
who is renowned as a craftsman of both persuasive judicial opinions
and lifelike sculpture and art. The Judge already has proved himself
to be a master of design and execution, and the structure and grace
of On Appeal serve to make it yet another example of his artistry.
The book is organized into fifteen tight, subdivided chapters that
follow a meticulously logical outline, a Coffin trademark. It makes
its points emphatically, but with the gentle and refined style that has
distinguished the Judge's opinions throughout his career on the
bench. While its insights, drawn from the Judge's nearly three decades of experience on the federal appellate bench, are often brilliant, it is not surprising given the author that On Appeal is
characterized by humility rather than ego.
On Appeal begins by tracing the roots of the American appellate
tradition, comparing and contrasting it with the English and civil law
traditions. It then moves briskly into a description of the American
appellate system in a chapter that draws its subtitle, "One Whole," 3
from Alexander Hamilton's integrated vision of the federal and
state court systems in The Federalist,No. 82. This chapter is peppered with statistics to impress upon the .reader the relative enormity of the state appellate court system when compared to its
federal counterpart. It also highlights the promise of state constitu* Director, Murray, Plumb & Murray, Portland, Maine; B.A., Dartmouth College, 1982; M.Sc., London School of Economics, 1983; J.D., University of Virginia,
1986; Law Clerk to the Honorable Frank M. Coffin.

1. Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Frst Circuit.
2. FRANK M. CoMN, ON APPEAL: CoURTS, LAWYERING, AND JuDGING,(1994).

3. Id.at 43.
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tional law in protecting individual liberties, an idea that has flourished in some states (although certainly not Maine) in recent years,
as well as a series of institutional "shackles"-such as elected
judges, underfunding, and diversity jurisdiction-that have worked
to perpetuate the image of the state court system as a poor cousin of
the federal system. Throughout the book, the Judge makes clear his
desire to see "state court systems of excellence and independence" 4
flourish, despite these ever-present impediments.
From there, On Appeal becomes far more personal, affording a
look into the Judge's chambers, into the semble of judges held after
each day of oral argument, and even into the Judge's own decisional
process. Having doubled his judicial experience since composing
The Ways of a Judge5 during his tenure as Chief Judge of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Judge appears more prepared than
ever to share a wealth of "inside" information with his readers and
even to grapple more deeply with the difficult question of how appellate cases should be decided.
The passages on life in the Judge's chambers open the door to
give the reader a glimpse as to how at least one successful appellate
judge handles the daunting workload imposed by his court. One
highlight of this chapter, which does not lack for details (right down
to the description of the neff basketball hoop in the law clerks'
workroom), is the Judge's portrait of the collaborative manner in
which he works with his law clerks, "treating them as colleagues,
something like junior partners in a small law firm."'6 While the
Judge's heavy reliance on the talents of recent law school graduates
may surprise the uninitiated reader, the training and development of
his "clever" of clerks obviously rank among the Judge's proudest
accomplishments.7
After a view of life in the chambers, On Appeal turns in its next
chapters to describe the nuts and bolts of how cases travel the road
to an appellate court and what happens once they arrive there. The
highlights in these chapters include the Judge's advice on preserving
the many different forms of error that may occur during trial. Also
worth taking to heart is the Judge's "list of likes" in reviewing appellate briefs. This list places a premium on excellent organization derived from outlining, recognizing and handling those issues on which
the writer is most vulnerable, and using "not one pejorative adjective or innuendo concerning one's opponent or the trial judge."'
The Judge also offers his views on what makes for a successful
oral argument before the court. Describing the present day as the
4.
5.
6.
7.

1. at 65.
FRANK M. CoFnIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE (1980).
ComnN, supra note 2, at 193.
Id.at 79.

8. Id.at 119-20.
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"Age of Tungsten" (in contrast to the "Golden Age" of Daniel Webster), the Judge emphasizes that an oral advocate must be able to
endure, without melting, the "heat" generated by the extremely limited presentation time allotted to each appeal and the pressure to
respond instantly and appropriately to the searching questions of
the judges.' The Judge's catalogue of critical questions that an advocate must be prepared to answer during oral argument provides
an excellent checklist for preparation.
The heart of the book deals with how appeals are, or should be,
decided. The Judge begins by describing the panel's post-argument
conference as "a large stewpot sitting on a low flame, just enough to
make it simmer, not boil, while various ingredients are gently added."' 0 In relating the various approaches taken by the court to resolve appeals, the Judge canvasses a variety of case types routinely
considered by the appellate court, from the frivolous "Rope of
Sand" appeal to the true "Blockbuster" case that requires intense
and time-consuming scrutiny from the court." He then offers three
chapters on "doing" judicial opinions that cover issues ranging from
his preference for intensive pre-argument preparation meetings with
law clerks, to his habit of immersing himself in the record of any
case for which he must prepare the draft opinion, to the etiquette
that surrounds the circulation and review of opinions among the
chambers of the other judges on the panel. What may be striking to
readers is the Judge's acknowledgment that the point of decision on
an appeal may come very late in the process, sometimes well after
the post-argument conference when the writing judge has her first
opportunity to dig deeply into the record of the trial at issue.
Equally interesting is the Judge's description of how he finally
reaches his own "point of decision" after keeping an open mind for
so long in the process.' 2
One of the recurring themes of On Appeal is its emphasis on the
importance of collegiality. Nowhere is the need for collegiality
more important than among appellate judges who, unlike almost
any other group in our society, must work together intimately as
true equals, often for the remainder of their professional lives, to
accomplish a common goal. The Judge's thoughtful definition of
collegiality among judicial colleagues is instructive:
The deliberately cultivated attitude among judges of equal status and sometimes widely differing views
working in intimate, continuing, open, and noncompetitive relationship with each other,
which manifests respect for the strengths of the others,
9. Id. at 129.
10. Id at 168.
11. Id. at 176.
12. Id at 185.
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restrains one's pride of authorship, while respecting one's own
deepest convictions,
values patience in understanding and compromise in nonessentials,
and seeks as much excellence in the court's decision as the
combined
talents, experience, insight, and energy of the judges
13
permit.
The Judge, however, is careful not to restrict the importance of collegiality to his relationships with Article III colleagues as he considers the work of his law clerks "as being just as collegial as judges'
work on a court."' 4 The Judge's desire to preserve collegiality at all
levels stems from his view that it is both "a guaranty of top judicial
work...15 [and] a cherished source of joy in the life of an appellate
judge.'
The Judge describes in some detail an array of non-collegial conduct to be avoided, including precipitate pronouncements on cases,
delayed responses to requests from other chambers, corrosive language, lobbying, and overly done criticism. This catalogue should
serve as a reminder to all of us in the legal community that collegiality does not just happen, but is achieved only as a result of active
efforts. The Judge obviously takes pride in the collegiality and consensus-building traditions of his own court, observing that this has
permitted him to restrict significantly his output of concurring and
dissenting opinions (only twenty-one and twenty-seven, respectively, out of 2300 total opinions in his career' 6). The Judge further
describes how he takes an active role in writing and editing his work
product at all times with an aim toward preserving collegial relations
with his colleagues. He even raises the topic under the rubric of
"sensitivity" when discussing both his practice of writing opinions
with due regard for how the language will be received by its various
audiences, as well as the need for appellate judges to have a "high
irritation
threshold" when dealing with parties, the bar, and the trial
7
bench.'
Other chapters, which are devoted to judging appeals, become
even more introspective. They deal with personal reflections of how
the Judge goes about doing the important work for which he was
appointed to the court. Judge Coffin describes the process of deciding appeals not as a search for the right answer, but as a search for a
"Grail of Legitimacy." He sees legitimacy at the appellate level as
being comprised of three components: (1) explaining the "anomaly" of unelected judges in a democracy, (2) assuring accountability,
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Ild. at
I& at
Id. at
Id at
Id. at

215.
175.
228-29.
225.
268-70.
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and (3) engaging in defensible decision-making." Although the
Judge mentions many branches of jurisprudence in discussing the
forces that have shaped his own thinking and decision-making, he
eschews allegiance to any one of them, deeming his own approach in
deciding cases to be "unashamedly eclectic."'19
To convey the significant differences between cases that cause appellate judges only routine stress and those that call for maximum
intellectual effort, the Judge divides the universe of appeals to be
decided into cases dealing with "familiar waters"'2 and those involving "uncharted depths."'" In the former set of cases, he posits that
the decision is constrained by multiple features of our appellate system, such as its adversarial nature, the need to rely on the decision
and record made in the trial court, the requirements that appellate
opinions be placed in writing and agreed upon by a majority of the
court, and a multitude of doctrines that require the appellate court
to defer to the trial court or agency (on factual findings), its own
past decisions, or the Supreme Court or state court of last resort (on
issues of law). He describes how even the routine cases sometimes
activate his "justice nerve," but explains how the inevitable "gap between law and justice" often places "severe limits" upon what can
be done by the court in the general run of appellate cases. 2 One
interesting sidelight in this discussion of cases that float in "familiar
waters" is the Judge's identification of a dangerous recent trend he
perceives in the use of summary judgment to resolve such cases,
which he describes as "a subtle tendency on the part of both trial
and appellate courts to devote less and less energy and analytical
thought to ... identifying the favorable reasonable inferences" owed

to the non-moving party? 3 He warns that the rush to judgment in
cases where favorable inferences have been overlooked actually can
result in a less efficient system because of the appellate court's need
to review a large record and, often, remand the case for further
proceedings.
A relatively smaller percentage of appellate cases occupy the
Judge's narrow category of "uncharted depths," because their outcomes "are not clearly determined by preexisting principles, rules,
or precedents."'2 4 In discussing these cases, On Appeal focuses its
spotlight on those cases that pit the interests of society against the
rights of individuals. The Judge, whose public service career in the
three branches of our government has spanned the birth and rapid
growth of such civil rights litigation, identifies the values he consults
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id at
d2 at
I& at
I& at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at

232.
247.
253.
275.
262-63.
265.
275.
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in deciding such cases-his four "cardinal beacons"-as liberty,
equality, workability, and community.' On the value of "workability," however, he cautions that "courts cannot be faithful to the constitutional primacy of individual rights
if they embrace a policy of
6
blanket deference to officialdom.
With the voice of a cautious civil libertarian, the Judge calls for
"some gradation in deference accorded to governmental institutions
and their representatives,"2 7 urges courts to show "a modicum of
healthy skepticism of undocumented administrative justification,"
and observes that, "[o]ver time ... more, rather than less, may be
expected from government officials and institutions in their actions
burdening individual rights."'
He then explains that the "rightssensitive balancing process" he uses to decide such hard cases is
neither marked by mechanistic means, nor covered by a single jurisprudential umbrella. Rather, it is process-oriented to the extent that
it requires the conscientious and candid revealing of the real reasons
supporting the decision. The Judge describes this process as "a selfconscious craftsmanship at every stage of the decision process, rejecting unspoken or facile assumptions and generalizations, and a
fairness in stating issues, facts, and arguments." 29 To illustrate the
application of this process, the Judge recalls three of his more important civil rights opinions in which his decisions in favor of indi30
vidual rights did not survive the scrutiny of the Supreme Court.
On Appeal closes its discussion of deciding difficult cases with a
brief look at a fourth emerging value to be added to the trio of liberty, equality, and workability. The Judge defines this new value of
"community" as:
[T]he self-interest a society has in preserving itself against the
instability, insecurity, and disintegration threatened by the
emergence, enlargement, and perpetuation of a very substantial underclass of uneducated, job-unqualified, welfare-dependent, unhealthy, despairing people living in dysfunctional
families, all too susceptible to drugs and crime, with no sense
31
of participation in, access to, or fealty toward that society.
Although the Judge notes that "community" is "not yet a factor in
federal or most state court adjudication,"3 2 he briefly outlines the
directions in which all three branches of our government will need
' 33
to move if they are to respond appropriately to this "core value
25. 1& at 281.
26. Id. at 284.
27. Id.

28. Id- at 285.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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and provide "ways and means to enable the grievously displaced
and disadvantaged to make reentry into the mainstream of
society."'
In a concluding chapter assaying the future, the Judge returns to
Hamilton's concept of "One Whole" and offers some modest proposals for preserving what is right with the American federal and
state appellate system, while improving what is wrong with it. These
ideas focus on promoting a high quality of life for appellate judges
so as to attract and retain candidates of unparalleled talent and ability and on enhancing communication between the federal and state
systems, the various branches of government, and the public at
large. On Appeal closes by posing, without answering, the "crucial
question ... whether the citizen majority and its least representative
institution can work together to safeguard our unique and timetested tradition."3 5 If we are fortunate, this question will serve as
the springboard for the Judge's next round of thinking and writing.
While canvassing a broad range of topics related to appellate jurisprudence, On Appeal succeeds at many levels and is sure to impress a variety of audiences with its thoughtful analysis. At its core,
however, On Appeal is a deeply personal gift to the legal community, both in Maine and across the country, from one of its most
celebrated members. For this gift, all of us should be most thankful.

34. Id. at 294.
35. Id. at 325.

